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MINNETTE M. RIEDMAN, 
D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t . 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ODESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The p r i m a r y q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d fo r r e v i e w i s w h e t h e r 
t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s t h a t t h e f t by r e c e i v i n g i s a 
s e p a r a t e c r i m e from c o n c e a l i n g s t o l e n p r o p e r t y , i s in c o n f l i c t 
w i t h Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 3 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , and S t a t e v . T a y l o r , 570 
P .2d 694 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) , b o t h which p r o v i d e t h a t t h e Utah t h e f t 
s t a t u t e c o n s o l i d a t e s t h e t h e f t o f f e n s e s unde r p r i o r law i n t o a 
s i n g l e o f f e n s e of t h e f t . 
OPIWION BELOW 
The o p i n i o n of t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s in S t a t e v . Ramon, 
57 Utah Adv. Rep . 3 0 , P .2d ( C t . App. 1987) and S t a t e v . 
Reidman. 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 0 , P .2d ( C t . App. 1 9 8 7 ) , 
Case No. 860013-CA 
Supreme C o u r t No. 
appears as Appendix A t o t h i s p e t i t i o n . A copy of t h a t c o u r t ' s 
order denying the S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n for r ehea r ing appears as 
Appendix B. 
JURISDICTION 
The lower c o u r t ' s op in ion was f i l e d on May 1 2 , 1987 
(Appendix A) . On J u l y 10 , 1987, an order denying the S t a t e ' s 
p e t i t i o n for r ehea r ing was issued (Appendix B ) . The S t a t e ' s 
p e t i t i o n for r ehea r ing t o l l e d the per iod in which t h i s p e t i t i o n 
for c e r t i o r a r i had t o be f i l e d , R. Utah S. C t . 45(c) ; t h e r e f o r e , 
the p e t i t i o n i s t imely f i l e d . This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n to 
review the d e c i s i o n of the c o u r t of appea l s by a w r i t of 
c e r t i o r a r i under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1986) . 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES IHVOLVH) 
1 . Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1978) 
Conduct denominated theft in this part 
constitutes a single offense embracing the 
separate offenses such as those heretofore 
known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny 
by bailees, embezzlementf false pretense, 
extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen 
property. An accusation of theft may be 
supported by evidence that it was committed 
in any manner specified in sections 76-6-404 
through 76-6-410, subject to the power of the 
court to ensure a fair trial by granting a 
continuance or other appropriate relief where 
the conduct of the defense would be 
prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by 
surprise. 
2. Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d), Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
4(d) (1982): 
The court may permit an indictment or 
information to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense 
is charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict 
an indictment or information may be amended 
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so as t o s t a t e t h e offense wi th such 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y as t o bar a subsequent 
p r o s e c u t i o n for t h e same offense upon t h e 
same s e t of f a c t s * 
STATEMENT Of TBE CASE 
A. Summary of Proceedings Below 
Respondents , Rodney James Ramon, and Minnet te M. 
Riedman, were charged wi th t h e f t by r e c e i v i n g , a second degree 
f e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1987) . 
Af ter a ju ry t r i a l , they were found g u i l t y of t h a t o f f e n s e . The 
c o u r t sentenced them t o terms of one t o f i f t e e n y e a r s in the Utah 
S t a t e Pr ison* 
On d i r e c t a p p e a l , t h e c o u r t of appea l s reversed 
de fendan t s 9 c o n v i c t i o n s on the ground t h a t r e c e i v i n g s t o l e n 
p rope r ty i s a s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t crime from conceal ing s t o l e n 
p r o p e r t y . Thus, t he amendment t o t he informat ion which provided 
a d d i t i o n a l language of concealment of t he p r o p e r t y , charged an 
a d d i t i o n a l or d i f f e r e n t offense than t h a t o r i g i n a l l y charged and 
t h e c o u r t held t h a t t h e amendment was improperly p e r m i t t e d . 
£aa£H, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 33 (Appendix A) . After o rder ing 
respondent t o r e p l y t o t he S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n for r e h e a r i n g , t h e 
c o u r t subsequent ly denied the p e t i t i o n for r ehea r ing wi thou t 
comment (Appendix B ) . 
B. F a c t s Relevant t o I s s u e s Presented for Review 
On the morning of December 9 , 1983, the employees of 
Western S t a t e s Sheet Metal d i scovered t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s had been 
b u r g l a r i z e d (R. 2 5 8 ) . I n i t i a l l y , i t was determined t h a t t h r e e 
c o i l s of s h e e t copper of approximately 10,000 pounds and 500 
pounds of p ie -shaped s c r a p copper had been taken (R. 258 , 259 ) . 
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Prior to 9:00 a.m. that day Western called Ms. Riedman 
at Industrial Salvage, described the missing copper and requested 
that she be cautious of anyone selling copper (R. 192, 195*96). 
Later that day Ms. Riedman purchased a 1300 pound coil of copper 
sheet and some additional pieces of copper, scrap and fabricated 
(R. 161-62). 
Ms. Riedman was later questioned that day by a Western 
employee as to whether she had purchased any copper (R. 224). She 
denied any purchase (R. 225) • After the Western employees left 
Industrial Salvage Mr. Ramon asked Ms. Riedman for the sales 
book, told her to make an "excuse or fairy tale" concerning the 
location of the book, and he placed the book in a storage 
compartment (R. 526, 560). 
Western employees later found a box of fabricated 
copper located near the rear fence of Industrial Salvage and 
notified the police (R. 276-78). 
When detectives arrived with an investigative subpoena 
to seize the sales records of Industrial Salvage, Ramon and 
Riedman told detectives that they did not know where the book was 
and suggested "the vigilantes," referring to Western employees, 
had taken it. 
Defendants were charged with the crime of Theft by 
Receiving in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (Supp. 
1987) . The State filed an amended information on May 16, 1984, 
which added the following emphasized language: 
THEFT BY RECEIVING, a Second Degree Felony, 
at 1532 Industrial Road, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about December 9, 1983, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6. Section 
4-
408, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in 
that the defendants, Rodney James Ramon, 
Minette M. Riedman and Bobby Dale North, as 
parties to the offense, received, retained, 
or disposed of the property of Western Sheet 
Metal knowing that it had been stolen, or 
believing that it probably had been stolen, 
or concealed, withheld, or aided in 
cpngealing or withholding any gych property 
from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof, and that the value of said property 
exceeded $1,000.00. (Emphasis added.) 
Defendants received notice of the proposed amendment on 
May 17. On May 23, defendants filed a motion for bill of 
particulars asking the court to require the State to specify 
which theory of guilt it would rely upon at trial. The court 
summarily denied the motion. 
ABSUMENT 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT 
CONCEALIK STOLEN PROPERTY AND RECEIVING 
STOLEN PROPERTY ARE TWO DISTINCT CRIMES AND 
THUS, MOST BE CHAHSED SEPARATELY IS CONTRACT 
TO ESTABLISHED LAW. 
Defendants were charged on December 20, 1983 with the 
crime of theft by receiving in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-408(1) (Supp* 1987). The information alleged: 
THEFT BY RECEIVING, A Second Degree Felony, 
at 1532 Industrial Road, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about December 9, 1983, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
408, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in 
that the defendants, RODNEY JAMES RAMDN, 
MINETTE M. RIEDMAN, and BOBBY DALE NORTH, as 
parties to the offense, received, retained, 
or disposed of the property of Western Sheet 
Metal knowing that it had been stolenv or 
believing that it probably had been stolen, 
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, 
and that the value of said property exceeded 
$1,000.00. 
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The Sta te f i l e d an amended information on May 16/ 1984 adding the 
following languages 
TOEFT BY RECEIVING, A Second Degree Felony, 
at 1532 Industr ia l Road, in Sa l t Lake County, 
S tate of Utah, on or about December 9, 1983, 
in v i o l a t i o n of T i t l e 76 , Chapter 6, Sect ion 
408, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in 
that the defendants, RODNEY JAMES RAMON, 
MINETTE Me RIEDMAN and BOBBY DALE NORTH, a s 
p a r t i e s to the o f f ense , r ece ived , re ta ined , 
or disposed of the property of Western Sheet 
Metal knowing that i t had been s t o l e n , or 
be l i ev ing that i t probably had been s t o l e n , 
pr concealedr withheld or eiflefl in 
concealing or withholding anv such property 
from the owner, knowing the property to be 
s t o l e n with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof , and that the value of said property 
exceeded $1,000*00. (Emphasis added). 
In the court of appeals , defendants argued that the 
amendment added an addit ional or d i f f e r e n t offense a l l eg ing that 
the defendants "concealed, withheld or aided in concealing or 
withholding s t o l e n property." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4 ( d ) , Utah Code Ann. S 77-
35-4(d) (1982) , provides: 
The court may permit an indictment or 
information to be amended at any time before 
verdic t i f no addit ional or d i f f e r e n t of fense 
i s charged and the subs tant ia l r i g h t s of the 
defendant are not prejudiced. After v e r d i c t , 
an indictment or information may be amended 
so as t o s t a t e the of fense with such 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y as to bar a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense upon the 
same s e t of f a c t s . 
Although the lower court acknowledged the rul ing in 
S ta te v . Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1220-21 (Utah 1984) , that a 
proposed amendment t o an information i s al lowable i f the 
amendment merely r e c i t e s language of the s t a t u t e o r i g i n a l l y 
charged, Ramon. 57 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32 , the Court reversed the 
6-
conv ic t ions because "It lhe genera l i ty of Peterson presupposes the 
charging s t a t u t e contains a s ing le o f f ense . The rule does not 
apply in the ins tant case s ince the s t a t u t e under which 
defendants were charged contains two d i s t i n c t crimes** IfiL. at 5* 
This holding appears to be contrary to Utah statutory law and 
c o n t r o l l i n g authority from the Utah Supreme Court. 
Utah has a consol idated the f t s t a t u t e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1978) provides: 
Conduct denominated thef t in t h i s part 
c o n s t i t u t e s a s ing le offense embracing the 
separate of fenses such as those heretofore 
Known as larceny , larceny by t r i c k , larceny 
by b a i l e e s , embezzlement, f a l s e pretense , 
e x t o r t i o n , blackmail , rece iv ing s t o l e n 
property. An accusation of thef t may be 
supported by evidence that i t was committed 
in any manner spec i f i ed in s e c t i o n s 76-6-40 4 
through 76-6-410, subject to the power of the 
court to ensure a f a i r t r i a l by granting a 
continuance or other appropriate r e l i e f where 
the conduct of the defense would be 
prejudiced by lack of f a i r n o t i c e or by 
surpr i se , (emphasis added). 
In g**f-e v* Tavlor. 570 P.2d 694 (Utah 1977) the Court s t a t e d : 
*The Utah thef t s t a t u t e conso l idates the of fenses 
known under prior law • • . into a s i n g l e offense 
e n t i t l e d t h e f t , and c l e a r l y evidences the l e g i s l a t i v e 
intent to e l iminate the previously e x i s t i n g neces s i ty 
of pleading and proving those separate and d i s t i n c t 
of fenses • • • • Al l that i s now required i s to plead 
the general offense of thef t and the accusation may be 
supported by evidence that i t was committed in any 
manner spec i f i ed in s e c t i o n s 40 4 through 410 of the 
Code, • . . ." 
I d . p*e a l s o State v . Seekford, 638 P.2d 525, 526-27 (Utah 
1981) . 
In S ta te v . Ba ir . 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983) the State 
charged defendant with reta in ing s t o l e n property and a t t r i a l 
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presented evidence of receiving and taking s t o l e n property. The 
Court stateds 
•The above-mentioned charges ( re ta in ing , 
rece iv ing and taking) are not themselves 
separate o f f e n s e s , although they are separate 
and d i s t i n c t substant ive d e f i n i t i o n s of the 
s i n g l e of fense of "theft". Under the 
consol idated the f t s t a t u t e , proof 
e s t a b l i s h i n g any one of these substant ive 
d e f i n i t i o n s w i l l support a general accusat ion 
or charge of • t h e f t " , ( c i t a t i o n s omit ted) . 
671 P.2d at 208. 
The purpose behind a consol idated the f t s t a t u t e i s t o 
avoid s i t u a t i o n s wherein a defendant i s charged with one form of 
t h e f t , and then a t t r i a l a l l e g e s he committed another form of 
t h e f t . 
I t i s of ten d i f f i c u l t for the po l i ce and 
prosecuting at torney , who find the defendant 
in exc lus ive posses s ion of property recent ly 
s t o l e n from the owner, to know whether he 
ac tua l ly s t o l e i t or whether he received i t 
from another who did the s t e a l i n g . This 
g i v e s a defendant, charged with larceny , a 
chance to urge that he received i t ; or , i f 
charged with rece iv ing , to c laim that he 
s t o l e i t . Once again , in moral qual i ty the 
two crimes, larceny and r e c e i v i n g , are a l i k e , 
as the general ly s imilar s ta tutory provis ions 
for punishment recognize . The two crimes may 
be thought of as simply two ways of 
misappropriating another's property. Thus 
the Model Penal Code brackets them together 
as merely two ways among several ways of 
committing the s i n g l e crime of t h e f t . 
W. LaFave and A. S c o t t , Jr . Criminal Law. § 8.8 (2nd Ed. 1986) . 
Because of the s p e c i f i c language in S 76-6*403 that 
t h e f t i s a s i n g l e of fense and "an accusat ion of the f t may be 
supported by evidence that i t was committed in any manner 
spec i f i ed in s e c t i o n s 76*6-40 4 through 76*6*410 • • ." , the 
present case f i t s squarely within the holding in Peterson. The 
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information charged defendants with thef t by receiving by t i t l e 
and sec t ion which apprised defendants of the o f fense . The 
amendment did not add an addit ional or d i f f e r e n t offense but 
merely added a d i f f e r e n t manner in which the crime of the f t was 
committed. £ ! • State v . R u s s e l l . 733 P.2d 162, 167 (Utah 1977) . 
The lower court did not d i s t i n g u i s h S 76-6-403 or Utah 
Supreme Court case law from the present case but instead re l i ed 
upon three Utah c a s e s 1 l i s t i n g separate elements for receiv ing 
s t o l e n property and concealing s t o l e n property. £affifiH# 57 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 32-33 . While the Court l i s t e d separate elements for 
rece iv ing s t o l e n property and concealing s t o l e n property in 
Murphy. L^ ffiffir and Pappas these cases should be interpreted as 
providing d i f f e r e n t substantive d e f i n i t i o n s for the general crime 
of t h e f t . In f a c t , in State v . Lamm. 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980) 
the Court had the opportunity t o separate S 76-6-408 in to two 
separate crimes. There, the defendant was charged with and 
convicted of thef t by receiving under S 76-6-408. The Court 
found that "the f a c t s of the present case f a l l within the l a t t e r 
port ion of t h i s prov i s ion , i . e . concealing or aiding in the 
concealment of s t o l e n property." 1<&. at 231. The Court could have 
divided S 76-6-40 8 in to two d i f f e r e n t crimes, receiving and 
concea l ing , but instead found that defendant was properly charged 
with S 76-6-408 and that defendant committed the crime of thef t 
through the act of concealing rather that r e c e i v i n g . The fac t 
that defendant committed the f t by concealing rather than 
1
 S tate Y» Murphy # 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 1980) > Sta te v . Lamm. 606 
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980); State v . Pappas. 705 P.2d 1160 (Utah 1985) . 
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rece iv ing did not make the d i f f e r e n t act6 l i s t e d in § 76-6-408 
d i f f e r e n t offenses* Instead, the ac t s l i s t e d in S 76-6-408 are 
d i f f e r e n t methods of committing the s i n g l e offense of t h e f t . 
This i s the l o g i c a l in terpre ta t ion in l i g h t of the consol idated 
t h e f t s t a t u t e and the fact that both a c t s are l i s t e d under the 
same t i t l e and s e c t i o n . 
The lower court a l s o c i t e s three cases from other 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s for the proposi t ion that concealing s t o l e n property 
i s a d i s t i n c t of fense from receiving s t o l e n property . 2 However, 
none of the j u r i s d i c t i o n s c i t e d by the Court had enacted 
consol idated the f t s t a t u t e s a t the time the opinions were 
reported. £££. Model Penal Code S 223.6 comment 1 , n . l (1982)} 
Okla. S t a t . t i t . 21 S 1713 (1983) | Tenn. Code Ann. S 39-3-1112 
(1982) . Although Oregon present ly has a consol idated t h e f t 
s t a t u t e , Or. Rev. S t a t . S 164 .015 , S164.025 (1985) , the £fig±£L 
case c i t e d by the lower court involved an Oregon criminal s t a t u t e 
enacted prior to that S t a t e ' s present consol idated the f t s t a t u t e . 
See State v . P o s t e r . 247 Or. 336, 427 P.2d 413, 415 (1967) . 
In e f f e c t , the lower court has created two separate 
o f fenses under the t h e f t s t a t u t e which i s contrary to Dtah 
s tatutory law and contro l l ing authority by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Although an intermediate court of appeals i s c e r t a i n l y 
f r e e to c r i t i c i z e the rul ings of the superior appe l la te court , 
A££ ZMSU, Selbv v . Department of Motor V e h i c l e s , 168 Cal . Rptr. 
2
 Whitwell v . S t a t e . 520 S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. 1975) | Brevet V. 
fitaJLft, 554 P.2d 18 (Okla. Cr. 1976) i S tate V, Postert 247 Or. 
336, 427 P.2d 413 (1967) • 
10 
36, 37-38 (Cal. kpp. 1980) , in performing the primary "error-
correct ing* function in a two-t iered appel la te system, i t i s not 
in a p o s i t i o n t o overrule superior author i ty , and i t general ly 
should re fra in from performing i t s "law-declaring" function in 
c a s e s of great moment. £&& State v . Grawien. 123 His.2d 428, 
432, 367 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Wis. App. 1985); Utah Code Ann. S 78-
2a-3(3) (Supp. 1986) (authorizing c e r t i f i c a t i o n of i s sues to 
Supreme Court)• 
The i ssue in the present case i s substant ia l and 
mandates intervent ion by t h i s Court for several reasons. F i r s t , 
the lower court has ignored contro l l ing authority re la t ing t o the 
appl icable rule of law. Second, i t s d e c i s i o n , i f l e f t 
unreviewed, would crea te unnecessary and unwelcome confusion on 
two important ques t ions : (1) must the State now in l i g h t of J&as&21 
charge defendants with s p e c i f i c methods of committing the crime 
of t h e f t , contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1978) j and (2) 
i s the Court's ruling in Peterson that an amendment i s allowable 
i f i t r e c i t e s the language of the s t a t u t e o r i g i n a l l y charged, no 
longer va l id law. Third, the apparent ease with which the court 
of appeals moved from the "error-correcting" arena into the "law-
declar ing" arena suggests that t h i s Court needs t o provide 
guidance on the ro le of an intermediate appel la te court in a two-
t i ered appe l la te system. Consistency in the appe l la te courts i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y important to the criminal j u s t i c e system, where the 
r i g h t s of v i c t i m s , s o c i e t y , and defendants — at stake in da i l y 
l i t i g a t i o n in the t r i a l courts — demand c lear ru le s of law. 
11 -
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing d i s c u s s i o n , the S t a t e ' s 
p e t i t i o n for a wri t of c e r t i o r a r i should be granted. 
DATED t h i s "7 of August, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Ass i s tan t Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIMS 
I hereby c e r t i f y that four true and correct cop ie s of 
the foregoing P e t i t i o n were mailed, postage prepaid, to Martin 
Verhoff, Attorney for Appel lant , 255 East 400 South, Su i te 100 , 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, t h i s / day of August, 1987. 
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bees requested of this court. See R. Utah Or. 
App. t. 1>e ninety day suspension of plain-
tiff's license expired, at the latest, ninety days 
alter the order of the trial court, or October l t 
IMS, 'Because the order of (suspension] has 
now expired by Its own terms, we refrain from 
adjudicating the aserfts of the issues raised/ 
On grounds of mootnett, the appeal b dis-
RusseOW* Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
ft. W. Oarff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
run* A*" is*.» 
IN TOE 
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Mvtta Vcrimf for AypcOtot 
David L. WOUMOB, Kisbcrty Horaftk for 
OPINION 
v>vnlJI| Judge* 
Defendants Rodney lames Ramon and 
hfinnctte M. B^frrtp appeal tbdr asperate 
OBBvtftioni of theft by receiving stolen prop-
erty! Utah Code Ann. |7t4-4M(l) (1906). 
Because the cases involve the same facts and 
tjbe seme dispositive Issue, we eoneolidate the 
oases, sua spouts, uud reverse both convict-
On Dicambw t , fft3, George Uuarn and 
Bam Mackie bwglerieed Western Sheet Metal 
ferseaylt<sUs^CedtAnBil57inT 
and stole one eighteen inch wide coil of copper 
sheet, which weighed about 2,500 pounds, and 
twenty-five eight feet by fifteen inch fabric-
ated panels. The next morning, December 9, 
as Ralph Montrone, the owner of Western 
Sheet Metal, and his employees arrived «t 
work, they discovered the burglary. After n 
quick Inventory, Montrooe tsrimaffd the 
stolen property to be three coils of copper 
sheet, touting approximately 10,000 pounds in 
weight, and 500 pounds of pie-shaped scrap 
copper. Montrone asked his daughter and 
employee, Laura, to telephone all the salvage 
metal dealers in Salt Lake County and notify 
them about the burglary. Sometime between 
1:10 and 9:30 that morning, Laura called co-
defendant Riedman, office manager at indu-
strial Salvage. Laura told Riedman about the 
burglary and described the property according 
to her father's instructions. Riedman took 
notes of the stolen property as described by 
Laura. 
At approximately 9:30 a.m., Unam and 
Mackie arrived at Industrial Salvage with the 
stolen copper. They drove through the front 
gate, past the front office where Riedman 
worked, and directly to the non-ferrous 
metal shed in the back of the yard. They 
unloaded the copper, and Bob North, an 
employee of Industrial, weighed it and filled 
out a yard receipt. On the receipt, North 
described the copper as '1653 pounds of 13 
light copper/ Linam and Mackie took the 
receipt to the front office and presented it to 
Riedman. As the two men entered the office, 
Roger Valentine, an employee at Western 
Sheet Metal, also entered the office. Riedman 
paid Linam and Mackie $559.02 in cash for 
the copper. As the two men left, Valentine 
wrote down the license plate number of their 
truck. Valentine then identified himself to 
Riedman. Riedman told him she had received 
Laura's phone call earlier that morning. Val-
entine asked Riedman if she had purchased 
any copper that morning. Riedman replied no. 
Defendant Ramon, the owner-manager of 
Industrial Salvage, entered the office at that 
time and told Valentine they did not see that 
kind of copper too often. As Valentine left the 
office, he noticed North in the non-ferrous 
metal shed carrying a panel Valentine recog-
nized as belonging to Western Sheet Metal. He 
left the yard, located a public telephone, and 
contacted Montrone. 
Shortly thereafter, Montrooe and another 
employee, Joe Sudbury, Joined Valentine at 
the entrance of Industrial Salvage. They 
entered the office and again asked Riedman if 
she had purchased any copper that day. 
Riedman again replied in the negative. Mont-
rone then asked If they could look around the 
yard. Riedman explained that they would need 
to talk to Ramon. The men went out in the 
yard to ask Ramon. He asked tfcsm to wait as 
be was busy with a customer. Twenty aainutes 
tOsdsoCe's 
S7 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS J] 
liter, Ramon escorted Mootrone and Valeo* 
tine through the yard. Tbey entered the oon» 
ferrous metal shed and asked North if he had 
reodved any copper that morning. North 
showed them a boa of scrap pieces with white 
paint on theoL Mootrone and Valentine then 
left the yard. 
Later that afternoon, Mootrooc'e wife and 
other employees at Western noticed a box near 
the west gate of Industrial Salvage. The box 
wis covered with a burlap doth, but sticking 
out of the box were fabricated pieces of 
copper resembling the stolen panels. Tbey 
contacted the Salt Lake City Police Depart-
Two detectives obtained an Investigative 
subpoena to sebe the sales records of Indust-
rial Salvage for that day. At about 3:30 pan., 
the detectives and an officer arrived at the 
she. As Ramon observed the policemen arrive, 
be asked Riedmaa for the sales book and put 
it away in a storage compartment in his office. 
He told Riedman to contact his attorney and 
to make up a story for the missing sales book. 
Ramon then went out into the yard. The det-
ectives entered the office, showed Riedman the 
subpoena, and asked for the sales book for 
thai day. Riedman told them she did not know 
where the book was, and suggested 'the vigi-
lantes,0 referring to Western Sheet Metal 
employees, had taken i t She called Ramon 
into the office, and be gave the detectives the 
same response* The detectives explained to 
Ramon the subpoena did not give them the 
right to search the yard and asked for his 
permission to do so* Ramon consented. The 
detectives walked through the noo-ferrous 
metal shed and to the back west gate where 
the box Western employees had identified was 
located. Montrooe, standing outside the gate, 
Identified the contents of the box as his. The 
detectives read Ramon his Miranda rights and 
asked him about the box. He said he knew 
nothing about it. Hie detectives told him tbey 
were going to sebe the box. 
By the time the men returned to the front 
office, Rkdman had contacted Ramon's att-
orney. After conversing with his attorney, 
Ramon turned the sales book over to the 
detectives and Riedman told them she reme-
mbered purchasing about 1,000 pounds of 
copper that morning. 
Ramon, Riedman, and North were charged, 
in an information filed on December 20, 1983, 
with the crime of Theft by Receiving in viol-
ation of Utah Code Ann. |764-40g(l) 
(19M). Tbe information alleged: 
THEFT BY RECEIVINO, a Second 
Degree Nooy, at 1332 Industrial 
Road, in Sak Lake County, State of 
Utah, no or about December 9, 
1*13, in violation of Title W, 
Chapter *, Section 401, Utah Code 
1953 as amended, in 
that the defendants, RODNEY 
JAMES RAMON, MINETTE M. 
RIEDMAN and BOBBY DALE 
NORTH, as parties to the offense, 
received, retained* or diipoeed of 
the property of Western Sheet 
Metal knowing that k had bean 
stolen, or believing that it probably 
had been stolen, with a purpoee to 
deprive the owner thereof, and that 
the vahie of said property exceeded 
11,000.00. 
The State filed an amended Information on 
May 16, 19S4, which added the following 
ffnrhstJTfrt languages 
THEFT BY RECEIVING, a Second 
Degree Felony, at 1332 Industrial 
Road, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on or about December 9, 
19*3, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 406, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1933 as amended, in 
that the defendants, RODNEY 
JAMES RAMON, MINETTE M. 
RIEDMAN and BOBBY DALE 
NORTH, as parties to the offense, 
received, retained, or disposed of 
the property of Western Sheet 
Metal knowing that it had been 
stolen, or believing that it probably, 
had been stolen, or conceded, wit-
hheld, or tided in conceiting or 
withholding May suet property from 
the owner, knowing the property to 
be stolen, with a purpoee to deprive 
the owner thereof, and that the 
value of said property exceeded 
$1,000.00. (Emphasis added.) 
Defendants received notice of the proposed 
amendment on May 17. On May 23, defend-
ants filed a motion for bill of particulars 
asking the court to require the State to specify 
which theory of guilt it would rely upon at 
trial. The court summarily denied the motion. 
Defendants Ramon and Riedmaa were 
Jointly tried by g jury and before the Hooor* 
able Jay E. Banks, Third Judicial District 
Court, on June 19*22, 1984. On the first day 
of trial, after the Jury had been selected, 
sworn, and admonished, the State formally 
moved to amend the information. Over defe-
ndants' objection, the court granted the 
State's motion. Defendants entered pleas of 
not guilty to the new Information and the trial 
proceeded that afternoon. The Jury found 
defendants guilty as charged on June 22, 1914, 
On August 22, the court denied defendant 
Riedmaa's motion In arrest of Judgment and 
sentenced both defendants to Indfifimlnatt 
terms of not Isss than ooe year or more than 
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. The 
court stayed the sentences and placed defen-
dants on probation under certain terms and 
conditions* Defendants filed their notices of 
fee UtsiCeds CcdsoCe's 
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appeal thai same day. 
On appeal, defendant* >oootend the trial 
court erred ID allowing the State to amend the 
information on the day of trial as the amen-
dment charged an additional or different 
offense and prejudiced their substantial rights. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d), Utah Code Ann. 
|7745«4(d) (1982), provides: 
The court may permit an indict* 
ment or information to he amended 
at any time before vwrdict If no 
additional or different offeme k 
charged and the anbetantial fights 
of the defendant are not prejudiced. 
After verdict, an indictment or 
Information may be amended ao at 
to state the offense with such part-
kukrity as to bar a subsequent 
prosecution lor the same offes 
upon the same set of facts. 
Under the Rale, the trial court may aDow an 
information to be amended if two conditions 
are met: (1) no additional or different offense 
Is charged, and (2) the substantial right* of the 
defendants are not prejudiced. 
In general, these two conditions are met 
where the proposed amendment to an infor-
mation merely recites language of the statute 
originally charged. Scare v. Petenon, (81 PJd 
1210, 1220-21 (Utah 19*4), (dting State r. 
Jbco, 655 P-2d 690,691 (Utah 1982)). In Peter-
ton, the defendant was charged with 
aggravated assault under Utah Code Ann. |76-5-103(l><s) (1978). The proposed 
amendment, granted on the secood day of 
trial, substituted subsection (b),* ... use* a 
deadly weapon or such means or force likely 
So produce death or serious bodily injury,* for 
subsection (a)," . • ». intentionally causes 
serious bodily injury to another/ as the basis 
of the charges. The offense, aggravated 
assault, remained the same. The Court found 
since 'the amendment to the information did 
wot change the bask charge/ no substantial 
right* were prejudiced and affirmed the trial 
conrt9srukng.Jtf.a*1221. 
The generality of Peterson pfesupposes the 
charging statute contain* a single offense. The 
rule does wot apply In the Instant ease since 
the statute wader which defendants were 
eharged contains two distinct crimes. 
In WbitwtD r. Bute, 520 S.WJd 3*8, S44 
{Tcna. 1975), the Tennessee Supreme Court 
held, *fe)ooosaliag stolen property Is an 
Offense distinct from and independent of toe-
giving stolen property/ Jse also Artwer v. 
Jkatr, 554 ?M 18, 21 fOkL Cr. 1976); Skate 
* Do**, S47 Or. 196, 427 PJd 413, 416 
f 1967). Prom o v analysis of Utah ease taw, 
that to also be the law In ihb 
la State *. Murphy, 617 PJd 199, 401 
(Utah 1910), the defendant was charged whh 
*eft by motiving b violation of section H * . 
408(1). The Utah Supreme Court outlined the 
bask element* of theft by receiving stolen 
property. Those dements are: 
11) property belonging i 
has been stolen; 
(2) the defendant received, retained 
or disposed of the stolen 
O) at the time of receiving, retai-
ning or disposing of the property 
the defendant knew or believed the 
property was stolen; and 
(4) the defendant acted purposely to 
deprive the owner of the possession 
of the property. 
In StMe r. Urnm, 606 PJd 229, 231 (Utah 
1980), the defendant was also charged under 
section 76-6-408(1). However, after a 
review of the facts, the Supreme Court held 
*(t)he facts of the present case fall within the 
latter portion of this provision, i.e., concealing 
or aiding in the concealment of stolen prop-
erty.* The Court then outlined the bask ele-
ments of theft by concealing or aiding in the 
concealment of stolen property. Those 
sou are: 
aided in 
0 ) property belonging >*o 
has been stolen; 
(2) the defendant 
Mng this property; 
(3) at the time he so aided in 
ealinj fa be knew the hem had 
atoien;and 
(4) his purpose in acting 
deprive the owner thereof of 
was -to 
The Court dearly lists separate dements for 
separate crimes. Of particular note are the 
second dements listed in each case. in MurpAy, 
the prosecution had to prove defen-
dant received, retained, or disposed of stolen 
property. In Uanm$ die prosecution had to 
prove defendant aided in concealing the stolen 
property. The third elements are also diffe-
rent. In Murphy, the prosecution was only 
required to prove defendant believed die pro-
perty was itokn whik in Lamm, the prosec-
ution had to prove defendant knew the prop* 
erty was stolen. 
Although not apparent In Murphy and 
Lamm, there is a difference even in the first 
element listed for the two crimes. In Skate v. 
Psppai, 705 fM 1169 (Utah 1985), the Court 
specified yet another distinction between rec-
eiving stolen property and concealing stokn 
property. The Court stated that far the latter 
part of the statute (conceafiag), the 
must In fact be stolen, l i e Court 
iKiwtver, that for the first part of the statute 
(receiving), the subject property seed not be 
stolen since the defendant might only befievt 
the property has been stolen. In ao holding, 
the Court eritkbsd Murphy bat oaly Insofar 
Oa*oCe*SJ IfcrssmpfaStUlBbCe* 
ft VTAH APVAECE RETORTS 
• i tbt ovltor etM suggested that even for theft 
by receiving,, tbt property BUM actually bt 
la Murphy, Lima, and kttr Appe*, tbt 
Utah Supreme Court has clearly held tbat 
receiving stolen property k a crimt itptratt 
and dlitiact from concealing stolen property* 
Tbt dissent suggests tbt ratiootlt behind 
finding two itptratt offenses uadtr section 76* 
6-401(1) can alio bt used to find six itparatt 
offtnitt In tbt lamt statute. Such U not tbt 
can. Tbt ttatutt» ai dra/ttd by tbt legislature, 
k divldtd Into two itparatt portion* or off* 
am: #A person oommlu thtft if bt receives, 
retains, or diipotti of tbt proptrty of anotbtr 
... or who conceal*, sells, (or) withhold! ... 
any lucb proptrty.../ (Emphask added.) Both 
offtniti contain a triplet of culpablt conduct*, 
but tach typt of conduct k not a itparatt 
offense, ai tvidtnetd by tbt itcond clement 
lifted above la Murphy. 
Because tbt amtndmtnt charged an additi-
onal or difftrtot offenit than that originally 
cbargtd, dtftndanti9 conviction* art rtvtntd. 
In light of thii decision, wt do not addrm 
dtftndaat Rltdmanfi claim of Imuffldtncy of 
tbt tvidtnet to tupport btr conviction, 
RuutO W. Bench, Judge 
JACKION, Jadgti (Concurring) 
Tbt opinion* la tbt* can dtmoaitratt tbat 
Utab Codt Ann. I76-6-40K1) (1916), 
modeled after ecctlon 223.6(1) of tbt Modal 
Ptnal Codt, k not artfully drafted. Tbt Utab 
Supreme Court ha* Indentlfled two teparate 
offeniei in tbe itatute. Stare v. Hppu* 703 
PJd 1169 (Utab IMS); State r. Lamm, 606 
?M 229, 231 (Utab I960); Stare r. Murphy, 
617 P Jd 399, 401 (Utab 1910). It k our fun-
cdoe to follow tboic deckion* until tbe Court 
rule* otberwke, or until tbe legislature rtvkei 
tbe itatute. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
OlME, Jndgci (Dkssattat) 
I agree with tbe ba*k approach employed by 
tbe oiajority. I dkient only became I do not 
believe tbat la tbe potturt of tbk caie 
•receiving' itokn property k a crime dktlnct 
from 'concealing0 stolen property, and 
because 1 believe tbat StM if. Htmoa, 611 
PJd 1210 (Utah 1964), k controlling. 
Tbe itatute in question, Utab Code AWL |?<*406(1) (1966), dsfihes as constituting 
At crimt of tbtft a aumbtr of closely related 
post-theft activities sometimes collectively 
referred to as 'receiving' stolen property, 
Tbess activities are manifestations of a single 
wrong condemned la law, namely tbat of 
dealing with stolen property, knowing or bet-
laving k was stolen, with tbe purpose of dep-
riving tbe owner of tbe property. I believe tbt 
statutt defines a singk crime-theft la vio-
lation of tbe statute. Tbat §76-6-406(1) 
defines a stagk crimt k a ooodasloa supp»» 
r t td by Utab Coda A n n . ft76»t* 
601(6X1971). »hich • * * * • tbs t tm *oftate» 
whb 'a violation of any penal statue of tbk 
If tbt majority k correct tbat tbk stngk 
statutt dtftats more than out crimt, I stt no 
rtason why it defines only two, 'receiving' 
and 'concealing/ since several other methods 
of dealing with stolen proptrty art mentioned. 
Indeed* under tbe majority's logic tbe run-of* 
the mill 'fence9 might be guilty of a multitude 
of 'crimes' every time be effected a sak of a 
singk hem of stolen property. He would bt 
auUty of oot crimt wbtn bt received tbe stolen 
item. He would bt guilty of a second If bt 
retained it, guilty of a third if tbat retention 
took tbe form of concealment, and necessarily 
guilty of a fourth since that retention, whether 
in the form of concealment or not, would 
constitute tbe withholding of property. He 
would be guilty of a fifth crime when bt dk» 
posed of tbe property and of a sixth If tbt 
dkposal was la tbt form of a sak. Wt would 
rightfully have link padtoot with a prottcutor 
who brought a six-count Information against 
such a perpetrator in tbe routine case. Our 
rationak would be tbat tbe fence bad really 
committed only one crimt, namely theft or 
'receiving' in violation of |76«406(1). 
Tbe majority*! conclusion tbat tbe statute 
describes more than one crime k mainly pro-
mised on tbe cases of Stale r. Murphy, 617 
P.2d 399 (Utah I960) and Stater. Lmm9 606 
P.2d 229 (Utah 1910). I concede those cases, 
by providing slightly different herniations of 
'elements/ are not ahogetbtr laooosisttot 
with the majority's conclusion. However, I 
believe tboee cases are fully consistent with my 
conclusion that tbe statute deflnei a singk 
crime, one which admittedly can be cstabUihcd 
by alternative avenues of proof. When both 
cases are read and considered, there k no 
escaping tbe conclusion that Murphy's crime 
would have been 'theft' In violation of I ? * 
#•401(1), as was Lamm's.* Nor doet the 
embellishment made by State r. ftppes, 70S 
FM 1169 (Utab 1915), in which tbe majority 
takes further comfort, require a different 
conclusion. In practical terms, Pappai k lrr» 
elevant to this case since tbe property hi que-
stion here was clearly stolen. Insofar as Jtypat 
bears indirectly on our aaalysls, It k 
quit! atutral. ftupas recognkts that several 
of tbe avenues of proof availabk to tbe pro-
secution under 176-6-406(1) are appropr* 
late where property has not actually been 
stolen but where the perpetrator believes it has 
been, as in tbe cess of tbe now faalliar 
'stina* operation. Nothing hi Hpp&B elevates 
these alternative avenues of proof to distinct 
offenses. When tbe dust settles, k k dear tbat 
Pappas's crime was also 'theft' in violation 
of 1764-406(1). 
tm VtaiCeie Ce*eCe'i 
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While this aspect of my disagreement with 
die majority may aaem largely semantical, I 
believe that In all events the case b controlled 
by Scare r. Peterson, 681 P J d 1210 (Utah 
1984). In Peterson, the amended information 
included an additional phrase from the aggr-
avated assault statute, the statute under which 
defendant was originally charged. In the 
instant case, the amendment did no more than 
add additional language from the 'receiving9 
statute under which defendants were originally 
charged. In Peterson, as here, 'the amend-
ment to the information did not change the 
bask charge/ itf. at 1221. In Peterson, as 
here, defendants were charged by title and 
section, 'which certainly apprised (them] of 
the statutory offense.' id. It is dear to me, 
semantics aside, that if the amendment in Peter-
loo was appropriate, eo was the amend-
ment to this caee. 
As no actual prejudice resulted from per-
mitting the amendment, I would affirm defe-
ndant Ramon's conviction. I also believe there 
is sufficient evidence in the record to suport 
Ricri man's conviction, and would therefore 
alto affirm her conviction. 
Gregory IC.Onnc, Judge 
1. It is true that Lamm's wrongful dealing with 
stolen property was in the form of aiding m its 
conrrahnrm while Murphy's allegedly wrongful 
dealing with stolen property was ia the form of 
retaining it, although the prosecution failed to prove 
the charge against Murphy. Unlike the majority, 1 
do not see a world of difference between the first 
phrase ia the statute, what the majority refers to as 
an off ease containing *a triplet of culpable 
conduct,* and the second phrase/triplet. On the 
contrary, 1 see considerable overlap between them. 
•Retaining,* for example, is in the first triplet, while 
'concealing* and 'withholding.' which I regard as 
saert varieties of retaining, are m the second. Mea-
nwhile, 'disposing' of stolen property b in the first 
triplet while 'selling/ simply a disposal ia exchange 
for valuable consideration, is grouped with concca-
Mag and withholding ia the second. 
Indeed, if the various 'culpable conducts' ia |?eV 
fXKftO) were to he logically grouped sato separate 
crimes, ascerving stolen property would he one; 
concealing, retaking, or otherwise withholding it 
from iu owner would he a second; and sailing or 
wthcrwise disposing of it would be the third. While 
each a scheme even makes some sense, our Legisla-
ture has chosen to lamp aO of these culpable cond-
ucts iato the single statutory offense sat forth in 
i * + 4 0 l ( l ) . 
f 7 U t n h A * v ! l e p . ) 4 
IN T H E 
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS 
Erring A. ROYLANCE, 
Plaintiff and Apprtmnr, 
v. 
Lyme B. HOWE, Dean L. Bristow, I , B . 
Moaaahan, and Mountain View Hospital, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges BtHinge, Gnrff and Jackson 
No. W00U-CA 
FILED: May U , 1 * 7 ; 
FOURTH DISTRICT 
Hon. J. Robert Bullock 
ATTORNEYS: 
S. Rex Lewis for Appellant 
David W. Slagle for Respondents 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Plaintiff Roylance brought an action against 
Doctors Rowe and Bristow, and Mountain 
View Hospital for medical malpractice arising 
from surgery performed in June, 1961. At the 
conclusion of Roylance's case-in-chief, 
defendant Mountain View Hospital was dis-
missed. Subsequently, the jury found the 
remaining two doctor defendants not negligent 
and judgment was entered in favor of defen-
dants, no cause of action. Roylance seeks 
reversal claiming the trial court erred (a) in 
not panting a directed verdict In favor of 
plaintiff and in failing to allow a new trial 
based upon the weight of the evidence; (b) in 
denying plaintiffs requested Jury instruction 
on res ipsa loquitur; and (c) in failing to 
dismiss defendant hospital at the commence-
ment of trial. We affirm. 
Roylance entered Mountain View Hospital 
for removal of an acute gangrenous perforated 
gallbladder. The emergency surgery was perf-
ormed by Drs. Rowe and Bristow. Following 
the surgery, the scrub nurse counted the 
sponges; the figures totaled and matched the 
initial count. After the doctors dosed Royl-
ance's incision, an i-ray was taken which 
revealed the presence of a 4* a 4* piece of 
gauze. The doctors checked Royiance's exte-
rnal bandages and bed clothes mid finding 
nothing, determined a sponge had been left 
Internally. The doctors thereafter performed 
another operation to locate the sponge or 
gauze; no sponge or gauze was located. This 
action was brought against Drs. Rowe and 
Bristow and Mountain View Hospital TO 
grounds that Roylance was subjected to unn-
ecessary surgery. 
APPENDIX B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— — O O O O O - — C " -.• f.-.n 
The State of Utah, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent* ) 
v. ) 
Rodney James Ramon* ) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
„- OR£El3DfW5rffcG PETITION 
»* FOR REHEARING 
No. 860005-CA 
The State of Utah, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent* ) 
v. ) 
Minette Riedman* ) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
No. 860013-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Plaintiff/ 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter, 
and the Court having duly considered said petition. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff/Respondent's 
Petition for Rehearing be denied. 
Dated this 10th day of July* 1987. 
FOR THE COURT: 
^ Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of July, 1987, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying Petition for Rehearing 
was nailed to each of the following: 
Martin Verhoef, Esq. 
Barber, Verhoef St Yocom 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David L. Wilkinson 
State Attorney General 
Kimberly K. Nornak 
Assistant Attorney General 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Julia Whitfield 
Case Management Clerk 
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The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Rodney James Ramon, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
July 9, 1987 
REMITTITUR 
No. 860005-CA 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Minette Riedman, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 860013-CA 
Defendants convictions are reversed. 
Issued: May 12, 1987 
Record: 4 vol 
CERTIFICATE OF MAJ 
X hereby certify that on the lfth day of Jp&aLr-1987, • true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Remittitur was mailed to each of the 
following: 
Martin Verhoef, Esq. 
Barber, Verhoef & Yocom 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David L. Wilkinson 
State Attorney General 
Kimberly K. Nornak 
Assistant Attorney General 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
Third District Court 
Salt LakeXity, Utah 
.tfield 
Case Management Clerk 
